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blockchain-black-team

执行针对智能合约和链下基础设施的真实世界区块链攻击场景。在对Solana（Anchor）、Ethereum（Solidity）或任何可编程区块链协议进行安全审计、渗透测试或攻击模拟时使用。当请求安全审查、攻击模拟、黑队、红队、渗透测试、漏洞利用分析或DeFi/区块链代码的脆弱性评估时触发。

person作者: jakexiaohubgithub
open_in_new仓库download下载资源包

Blockchain Black Team — Real-World Attack Simulation

When to Use This vs Others

  • Use this (Black Team) when you want historically proven attack vectors mapped to real incidents and immediate exploitability checks.
  • Use blockchain-red-team for novel/zero-day style techniques and bypass research beyond known patterns.
  • Use blockchain-purple-team for meta-level coverage gaps, audit failure causes, and architecture/ops blind spots.

Execute battle-tested attack vectors from 70+ historical blockchain incidents ($10B+ total losses) against target protocol code.

When to Use

  • Security audit of smart contracts (Solana Anchor, Solidity, CosmWasm)
  • Attack simulation / penetration testing of DeFi protocols
  • Pre-mainnet security hardening
  • Hackathon security review
  • Post-incident analysis using real-world patterns

Quick Start

  1. Read the target codebase (on-chain + off-chain)
  2. Load references/attack-matrix.md for the 44+ vector framework
  3. For each vector: map historical pattern → target code → attack scenario → severity
  4. Output structured report with PoC sketches for CRITICAL/HIGH findings

Attack Matrix (62+ Vectors, continuously extended)

The full matrix with historical references, code-level mechanisms, and defense patterns is in references/attack-matrix.md. Summary:

A. Smart Contract (core 13 + extended A32/A33/A34/A35/A36/A38)

| # | Vector | Historical Example | Typical Severity | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | Reentrancy | The DAO ($60M), Curve/Vyper ($70M) | HIGH-CRITICAL | | 2 | Flash Loan | Mango ($114M), Euler ($197M) | CRITICAL | | 3 | Oracle Manipulation | Mango, BonqDAO ($120M) | CRITICAL | | 4 | Access Control | Ronin ($624M), Wormhole ($320M) | CRITICAL | | 5 | Integer Overflow/Underflow | Compound ($147M) | HIGH | | 6 | Account Substitution (Solana) | Cashio ($52M) | HIGH | | 7 | Signature Replay | Wintermute ($160M) | HIGH | | 8 | Front-running/Sandwich | MEV ecosystem | MEDIUM | | 9 | Proxy Upgrade Attack | Nomad ($190M) | HIGH | | 10 | Logic Bug | Compound ($147M), Cream ($130M) | HIGH | | 11 | Rent/Lamport Drain (Solana) | Multiple | LOW-MEDIUM | | 12 | CPI Confusion (Solana) | Crema ($8.8M) | HIGH | | 13 | PDA Seed Collision (Solana) | Multiple | MEDIUM |

B. Off-chain/Keeper (core 7 + extended B29/B35/B36/B37/B38)

| # | Vector | Historical Example | Typical Severity | |---|---|---|---| | 14 | RPC Manipulation | Multiple | HIGH | | 15 | Key Compromise | Ronin ($624M), Harmony ($100M), IoTeX ioTube ($4.4M) | CRITICAL | | 16 | Race Condition | Multiple keeper exploits | MEDIUM | | 17 | Checkpoint Poisoning | Novel | HIGH | | 18 | Config Injection | Multiple | HIGH | | 19 | Memory/Log Leak | Slope wallet drain | MEDIUM | | 20 | Denial of Service | Solana network halts | MEDIUM | | 29 | AI Agent Prompt-Injection Confused-Deputy | Trail of Bits Comet audit (2026) | HIGH | | 37 | AI Agent Steganographic Oversight Evasion | arXiv 2602.23163 (2026-02-26) | HIGH | | 38 | Multi-turn Tool-Return Boundary Takeover (IPI) | arXiv 2602.22724 + 2602.22302 (2026-02-25/26) | HIGH |

C. Economic (6 vectors)

| # | Vector | Historical Example | Typical Severity | |---|---|---|---| | 21 | Bank Run / Depeg | UST/LUNA ($40B), USDC SVB | CRITICAL | | 22 | Collateral Manipulation | stETH depeg, Tether FUD | CRITICAL | | 23 | Governance Attack | Beanstalk ($182M) | HIGH | | 24 | Sybil Attack | Multiple | MEDIUM | | 25 | MEV Extraction | MEV ecosystem | MEDIUM | | 30 | Liquidity-Exhaustion Griefing | Intent bridge study (2026) | MEDIUM |

D. Infrastructure (core 4 + extended D32/D33/D34)

| # | Vector | Historical Example | Typical Severity | |---|---|---|---| | 26 | Frontend XSS/Injection | BadgerDAO ($120M) | HIGH | | 27 | RPC Endpoint Takeover | Multiple | HIGH | | 28 | Supply Chain | event-stream, ua-parser-js | HIGH | | 31 | Protocol-Metadata Confusion (IDL/Schema Trust) | Anchor IDL external-account patch (2026) | HIGH |

Daily Evolution Log (Recent)

| Date (KST) | Incident | Vector Mapping | Delta Applied | |---|---|---|---| | 2026-03-15 | Aave wstETH CAPO oracle misconfiguration (2026-03-10, $27.78M): Chaos Labs Edge Risk engine computed snapshotRatio 2.85% below market → AgentHub auto-executed 1 block later with no human gate → 34 healthy E-Mode positions liquidated. No attacker. First confirmed large-scale loss from fully automated risk parameter pipeline. | A62 NEW | 1 NEW VECTOR (A62). Total matrix: 62 named vectors. Microstable: A62 ✅ DEFENDED (2-of-3 keeper quorum + manual oracle mode time-box; no automated rate-cap executor exists). Full sweep below — 0 new CRITICAL/HIGH. Carry-forwards: B45 HIGH (audit-attestation.json unattested delta persists), A43 MEDIUM, B44 MEDIUM. | | 2026-03-13 | DBXen ERC-2771 sender mismatch exploit (2026-03-12, $150K): burnBatch() used _msgSender() but onTokenBurned() callback used msg.sender → forwarder addr credited; permissionless forwarder + fresh-address fee backdating bug amplified. bonk.fun domain hijack (2026-03-12): team account compromised → DNS takeover → wallet-drainer JS injected on canonical domain. D26 escalation note: server-level CSP header required (meta-tag alone cannot block server-injected scripts). | A61 NEW + D26 reinforced | 1 NEW VECTOR (A61). Total matrix: 61 named vectors. Microstable: A61 NOT APPLICABLE (Solana, no ERC-2771). D26: Microstable dashboard has CSP meta tag ✅ — but no server-level HTTP CSP header (static file serving). LOW carry-forward. Full sweep: no new CRITICAL/HIGH findings today. Carry-forwards: B45 HIGH (audit-attestation.json unattested 3,281-line delta persists), A43 MEDIUM, B44 MEDIUM. | | 2026-03-12 | Source sweep: no new incidents in 24h window (last: Gondi NFT $230K 2026-03-10, A4 reinforcement); SlowMist/rekt.news/Halborn/Brave confirmed — 0 new DeFi exploits March 11-12. Full 79-vector Microstable sweep: B45 HIGH still open (audit-attestation.json absent; 3,281-line unattested delta persists), A43 MEDIUM open (no cumulative drift accumulator in rebalance()), B44 MEDIUM open (no delegate.is_none() check in mint()). D26 LOW-NEW: vendor/solana-web3-1.95.3.iife.min.js loaded without SRI integrity attribute — self-hosted so low severity, but should be hash-verified for tamper detection parity. | 0 NEW | Matrix holds at 79 vectors. No new pattern from March 11–12 sweep. Open carry-forwards: B45 HIGH (priority), A43 MEDIUM, B44 MEDIUM, D26/D33 LOW. Gondi (2026-03-10) confirmed A4 dual-authorization pattern: function-level auth ≠ asset-level ownership — bundler-pattern applies equally to any batch/multicall abstraction over user-owned assets. | | 2026-03-09 | OtterSec "Unfaithful Claims: Breaking 6 zkVMs" (2026-03-03) — Jolt/Nexus/Cairo-M/Ceno/Expander/Binius64 all vulnerable to Fiat-Shamir public-claim unbound variable bypass | A50 (NEW) | Added zkVM Fiat-Shamir Public-Claim Unbound Variable Bypass; distinct from A49 (gamma=delta setup constants) — A50 correct constants but wrong transcript binding order pre-challenge squeeze; proof forgery enables arbitrary false statement claiming; Microstable ✅ not applicable (no zkVM); future integration gate: transcript binding-order audit + forged-claim CI test required | | 2026-03-08 | CrossCurve bridge ReceiverAxelar.expressExecute() missing gateway validation (2026-02-02, $3M multi-chain) | A48 (NEW) | Added Unguarded Cross-Chain Receiver Function vector; distinct from A32 (IBC content forgery) — attacker bypasses relay entirely by directly calling receiver; Microstable ✅ not applicable (no bridge receiver); onlyGateway modifier pattern documented | | 2026-03-07 | Solv Protocol BRO vault ERC721 callback double-mint exploit (2026-03-06, $2.7M / 38 SolvBTC drained via 22-iteration dual-execution) | A46 (NEW) | Added ERC721 Callback Reentrancy / Dual-Execution Mint vector; distinct from A1 (not loop re-entry); reinforced NFT-callback CEI discipline; Microstable ✅ not applicable (SPL Token classic, no callbacks) | | 2026-03-05 | Localhost WebSocket takeover hardening signal (OpenClaw v2026.2.25 + Oasis disclosure) | B48 | Added localhost trust-boundary collapse vector for agent-controlled keeper ops; reinforced browser-origin gateway threat modeling, no-loopback-exception controls, and pairing/origin hardening requirements | | 2026-03-02 | Holdstation DeFAI Smart Wallet (2026-02-25, $462K) | B15 (tentative) | Added to incidents timeline; mechanism pending (MFA bypass / session theft in AI-integrated wallet). DeFAI surface note added: AI intent layer + signing authority co-location amplifies B15/B29 exposure | | 2026-03-02 | February 2026 monthly loss total (~$37.7M, lowest since Mar 2025) | Meta | Contextual stat: phishing = $8.5M of total (22%). Key-compromise-class still dominant vector | | 2026-03-01 | AgentSentry + Agent Behavioral Contracts (arXiv 2602.22724 / 2602.22302) | B38 | Added multi-turn tool-return boundary takeover vector and runtime contract-based mitigation notes | | 2026-03-01 | Immunefi bug-bounty telemetry lag signal (2-week disclosure delay) | A34, B15 | Added signal-latency-blindness note: public bounty metrics lag should not drive real-time incident prioritization | | 2026-03-01 | FOOMCASH zkSNARK verifier drift exploit (~$2.26M) | A38 | Added new ZK verifier-key misbinding vector with code-level key-hash/circuit-version defenses | | 2026-03-01 | Trail of Bits Comet prompt-injection audit techniques | B29 | Reinforced confused-deputy vector with fake system/user delimiters + fake validator/CAPTCHA multi-step exfil patterns | | 2026-02-28 | YieldBlox Blend V2 collateral chain exploit ($10.97M) | A3, A36 | Elevated "thin-liquidity collateral + raw-latest oracle adapter + lending health-factor" as a compositional failure chain (not single oracle bug) | | 2026-02-28 | AI oversight-evasion research signal (arXiv 2602.23163) | B37 | Added covert-channel/steganographic agent bypass pattern (post-prompt-injection hardening bypass class) | | 2026-02-28 | Stake Nova redeem-path exploit ($2.39M) | A2, A10 | Reinforced flash-loan-amplified redeem validation failures (RedeemNovaSol) and added Solana-specific redeem-path hardening pattern | | 2026-02-26 | IoTeX ioTube validator key compromise ($4.4M) | B15 | Added new key-compromise case + keeper key hygiene emphasis | | 2026-02-25 | Moonwell oracle incident ($1.78M bad debt) | A3, A10, B18 | Added oracle unit-normalization misuse pattern, governance timelock recovery-gap note, and feed-composition sanity defenses |

Defense Failure Patterns (Meta, Purple-Team Informed)

Black Team 점검 시, "취약점 존재"만 보지 말고 방어가 왜 실패하는지를 같이 기록한다.

  1. Control Fragmentation: 감사/바운티/모니터링/IR가 분리돼 신호가 연결되지 않음.
  2. Rollback Latency: 문제 인지 후 안전한 롤백까지의 의사결정·권한 체인 지연.
  3. Assumption Drift: 배포 당시 안전하던 임계치/가정이 시장·인프라 변화로 무효화.
  4. Confused-Deputy Ops: AI/자동화 도구가 비신뢰 입력을 권한 있는 행동으로 변환.
  5. Capacity Griefing: 단일 대형 공격보다 지속 저강도 압박으로 운영 여유를 소진.
  6. Market-Quality Blindness: 가격 정확성만 보고 시장 깊이/분산도/거래활동 품질을 신뢰 경계에 포함하지 않음.
  7. Telemetry-Truth Drift: 대응 단계에서 공지 지표(순손실/동결액)와 온체인 사실이 분리되어 의사결정·포렌식이 오염됨.
  8. Signal-Latency Blindness: 공개 바운티/리포트 통계의 지연(예: 2주 지연 반영)을 실시간 위협 지표로 오용해, 이미 진행 중인 변형 공격 대응 우선순위를 놓침.
  9. Localhost-Trust Mirage: 운영 환경에서 localhost를 무조건 신뢰해 rate-limit/origin/pairing 예외를 두면, 브라우저-origin 로컬 WebSocket 경로로 인증 경계가 붕괴될 수 있음. 온체인 감사만으로는 탐지되지 않는 운영 계층 실패.

리포트의 각 HIGH/CRITICAL 항목에 아래를 추가:

  • Why defense failed (설계/운영/조직 중 어디가 끊겼는지)
  • Recovery path (탐지→차단→복구까지 실제 실행 경로)

Execution Methodology

For each of the 44+ vectors:

  1. Historical Reference — Which real incident used this vector, what was the mechanism
  2. Code Mapping — Identify exact file:line in target code where vector applies
  3. Attack Scenario — Step-by-step attack procedure (numbered steps)
  4. Current Defense — Evaluate: Defended / Partially Defended / Undefended
  5. Severity — CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW / INFO
  6. PoC Sketch — For CRITICAL/HIGH: pseudocode or concrete attack commands
  7. Remediation — Code-level fix recommendation

Chain-Specific Considerations

Solana (Anchor)

  • Account model: owner checks, PDA derivation, account data validation
  • CPI: cross-program invocation target verification, signer propagation
  • Rent: minimum balance, account close lamport drain
  • Discriminator: Anchor 8-byte discriminator collision risk
  • Clock/Slot: slot-based timing vs real-time assumptions

Read references/solana-specific.md for Solana-specific attack patterns.

Ethereum (Solidity)

  • Storage layout: delegatecall + storage collision
  • Reentrancy: external calls before state updates
  • ERC-20 approval: infinite approval + permit signatures
  • Proxy patterns: UUPS/Transparent upgrade risks
  • ERC-2771 meta-transaction: mixed msg.sender/_msgSender() + permissionless forwarder (A61)

Read references/ethereum-specific.md for EVM-specific attack patterns.

Report Format

Output as structured markdown:

# Black Team Report — {Protocol Name}

## 0) Summary Dashboard
- Total vectors evaluated: 44
- CRITICAL: X | HIGH: X | MEDIUM: X | LOW: X
- Undefended (immediately exploitable): X

## Top 5 Most Dangerous Scenarios
1. ...

## {N}) {Vector Name}
- **Historical Reference**: {incident, amount, mechanism}
- **Code Mapping**: {file:line}
- **Attack Scenario**: {numbered steps}
- **Current Defense**: {Defended/Partial/Undefended}
- **Severity**: {level}
- **PoC**: {code/commands for CRITICAL/HIGH}
- **Remediation**: {specific code fix}

Cycling Protocol

Black Team is designed to run in loops with Blue Team:

Black R1 → Blue fix → Black R2 → Blue fix → ... → ZERO CRITICAL/HIGH

On repeat runs (R2+):

  • Re-evaluate ALL 44 vectors against updated code
  • Verify previous fixes actually work (bypass attempts)
  • Check for regression (new vulnerabilities from fixes)
  • Only report NEW or UNFIXED findings
  • Target: ZERO CRITICAL + ZERO HIGH to exit loop